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DEBATE 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 
“Judicial activism,” writes Professor Kermit Roosevelt, of Penn, has 
been employed as an “excessive and unhelpful” charge—one “essen-
tially empty of content.”  As a substitute, Roosevelt reviews here the 
framework for analysis of Supreme Court opinions that receives fuller 
treatment in his recent book, The Myth of Judicial Activism.  Professor 
Richard W. Garnett, of Notre Dame, is willing to go along with “much, 
though not all, of” Roosevelt’s position.  Ultimately, Garnett suggests 
“that ‘judicial activism’ might be salvaged, and used as a way of identi-
fying and criticizing decisions . . . that fail to demonstrate th[e] virtue” 
of constitutional “humility.” 
OPENING STATEMENT 
Against “Activism” 
Kermit Roosevelt III†
In this debate I will review the argument from my just-published 
book, The Myth of Judicial Activism.  The book attempts to achieve two 
things:  first, to counteract what I felt was excessive and unhelpful po-
litical use of rhetoric about “judicial activism,” and second, to offer a 
more useful perspective from which to judge Supreme Court deci-
sions, for lawyers and non-lawyers alike. 
The negative argument of the book is that “judicial activism,” as 
the phrase is typically used, is essentially empty of content; it is simply 
an inflammatory way of registering disapproval of a decision.  It is 
supposed to indicate that a judge has decided a case based on per-
sonal policy preferences rather than law.  But this is not a fair descrip-
tion of controversial constitutional cases for two reasons.  First, I’m 
pretty confident that almost no judge has ever believed that he or she 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
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was deciding a case this way, and I’m certain that they don’t do so with 
anything like the frequency critics charge. 
Second, and more important, most of the difficult and controver-
sial constitutional cases don’t have clear right answers.  The charge of 
activism relies on the idea that there is a clear answer that judges are 
ignoring (and therefore that they must be motivated by something 
other than a good faith desire to apply the Constitution).  But this so-
called “plain meaning” turns out to be indeterminate in many cases:  
the First Amendment doesn’t tell us what counts as speech (art? 
dance? nude dance?) or what’s an abridgment (firing from a govern-
ment job?).  Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause doesn’t tell us 
which kinds of discrimination are forbidden and which are permitted.  
Because there is no plain meaning that decides the difficult cases, I 
argue, courts must create doctrine that takes the judges from the gen-
eralities of the Constitution to decisions in specific cases.  Doctrine is 
what we should be evaluating, and the key issue in evaluating doctrine 
tends to be whether the Court is showing an appropriate level of def-
erence to the government actor whose conduct it is reviewing. 
Before turning to a discussion about appropriate deference, a 
quick digression on doctrine and meaning is appropriate.  Original-
ism, in one variant—which I call “application originalism”—suggests 
that doctrine is unnecessary.  Instead, we can use the expectations of 
the drafters or ratifiers as to how general constitutional language 
would apply in specific cases.  So, for instance, rather than crafting a 
doctrinal rule to reflect how deferential or suspicious courts should be 
with respect to racial discrimination by states, we can ask whether the 
ratifiers would have believed that a particular act of discrimination 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.  This approach to constitutional 
interpretation is frequently mistaken because we would better serve 
both the purpose of many general constitutional provisions and the 
understanding of their ratifiers if we read them to announce general 
standards that are to be applied in light of contemporary circum-
stances.  So if, for example, we take the basic meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause to be a ban on unjustified discrimination, the rele-
vant constitutional question is not whether racially segregated state 
public schooling appeared unjustified in 1868, but rather whether it 
appears unjustified now.  Because history can’t answer that question, I 
argue, we do in fact need doctrine. 
So this brings up the question of how to decide whether the doc-
trine that the Court has crafted is sensible.  The best way to do this, I 
suggest, is to think in terms of deference.  Deference strikes me as the 
central concept for two reasons.  First, a surprising amount of doc-
trine boils down to the choice of a particular level of deference—for 
2006] JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS 114 
instance, that is how I read the tiers of scrutiny, which of course crop 
up all over the place.  Second, if we are concerned about courts abus-
ing their power and usurping the policymaking function of other gov-
ernmental actors, a lack of appropriate deference is the basic form 
that this abuse and usurpation would take.  Also, the deference in-
quiry is manageable, whereas trying to decide whether a particular de-
cision is correct or not is very hard and very technical and hence not 
likely to be a useful endeavor for non-lawyers. 
How do we decide whether the level of deference is appropriate?  
I think there is a fairly small set of factors that suggest when courts 
should defer or should not.  In the book, I identify what I think are 
the four most important.  Institutional competence goes to the respective 
abilities of courts versus legislatures or executive officers to decide a 
particular question.  Because I read many important constitutional 
provisions to have a cost-benefit balancing component (e.g., the Equal 
Protection Clause in part tells states not to discriminate against some 
group unless the discrimination produces net benefits to society, 
though also in part not to do so out of hostility), which institution is 
better at assessing costs and benefits in a particular context will fre-
quently be relevant.  And, to the extent that the assessment relies on 
weighing competing policies, the decision should generally be left to 
the representative branches for reasons of democratic accountability. 
This is a Legal Process sort of consideration.  Defects in democracy at-
tempts to identify cases in which the legislative assessment will be sus-
pect for structural reasons—as when benefits of a law go to in-staters 
and costs fall on out-of-staters.  This is a John Hart Ely/process theory 
consideration. Lessons of history considers whether particular actors 
have proven themselves trustworthy or untrustworthy in particular cir-
cumstances.  This is where a history of discrimination against a par-
ticular group would come into the equal protection analysis, for in-
stance.  Costs of error attempts to decide whether it is worse in a certain 
set of cases for the courts to err by upholding an unconstitutional act 
or striking down a constitutional one.  This consideration will lead 
courts to adopt stances that produce different error distributions.  If, 
for instance, the only constitutional question is whether a law is in the 
public interest, the costs of error factor will ordinarily suggest defer-
ence.  The harm of a mistake in a close case is small, and a legislature 
that makes a mistake can realize that and correct it fairly easily, 
whereas a mistaken judicial decision is harder to fix.  But if the error is 
one that would impose very high costs on a small group of individuals 
and is unlikely to be remedied through the democratic process, the 
costs of error factor might suggest less deference (the “beyond a rea-
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sonable doubt” standard, evidently reflecting a belief that it is worse to 
convict the innocent than to acquit the guilty, is an example). 
All of this sounds reasonable, I hope.  Disagreement will arise in 
applying the factors to particular cases.  But here I try to stay reason-
able by judging the Court’s decisions using a very weak criterion.  In 
most difficult cases, there will be factors pointing in different direc-
tions, and any reasonable reconciliation of the competing factors is 
legitimate.  That is, different judges will, appropriately, have different 
views as to the relative significance of these factors, and they will reach 
different conclusions about how much deference is appropriate in 
particular cases.  There really aren’t right answers here, so all we can 
ask is that the judges be sincere and, to some extent, consistent.  Most 
decisions will turn out to be legitimate.  But, I like to say:  this is not a 
bug, it’s a feature.  Most of what the Court has been doing is legiti-
mate. 
A couple of examples will illustrate how these factors may be ap-
plied to Court decisions.  Heightened scrutiny (a lack of deference) 
for discrimination against women is supported by the lessons of his-
tory factor (see, e.g., coverture).  How gender discrimination doctrine 
fares under a defects in democracy factor is unclear:  women are un-
derrepresented in legislatures but are a majority of the electorate.  
The institutional competence factor almost always suggests deference.  
The costs of error factor will probably depend on the particular issue.  
Taking all of these factors into account, a court could legitimately 
come out either way on the question of whether heightened scrutiny 
is appropriate.  So what’s the use?  There is some value in focusing 
disagreement on the relevant factors and their respective significance.  
But there might also be a value in structuring analysis in a way that 
highlights consistency, or the lack thereof.  If the Court says that 
heightened scrutiny is not appropriate, or not appropriate only be-
cause of women’s voting power, then it will be hard for that Court to 
explain why heightened scrutiny is appropriate for affirmative action. 
In other cases, it’s very hard to justify the level of deference the 
Court uses.  Too much deference to the purported innocent justifica-
tion for racial segregation was the problem in Plessy, and it’s hard to 
see why the Louisiana legislature of 1890 should have been trusted.  
Too little deference to the legislature was the problem in Lochner, and 
it’s not obvious why the legislature wasn’t simply the better decision-
maker (though I think that Lochner is more defensible than commonly 
supposed).  And, to be provocative, I find the lack of deference hard 
to justify in the Section 5 cases like Garrett and Kimmel, in Commerce 
Clause cases like Morrison (Lopez is a little easier), in the adoption of 
strict scrutiny for affirmative action, and in Bush v. Gore (though I also 
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think there’s more to say about that case).  I look forward to your 
thoughts. 
REBUTTAL 
The Virtue of Humility 
Richard W. Garnett†
Kermit Roosevelt’s opening statement—which sets out the argu-
ment of his new book, The Myth of Judicial Activism—is a characteristi-
cally thoughtful and engaging contribution to the conversation about 
the role of judges, and the nature of good judging, under our Consti-
tution.  As he predicted, I agree with much, though not all, of what he 
says.  I will try here to flag a few of my disagreements, and also to iden-
tify some points where a bit of clarification might help me embrace 
Professor Roosevelt’s arguments.  I will also pose a few questions for 
him—questions that are prompted by his initial contribution—that I 
hope he will address in his closing argument. 
For starters, I agree that, for the most part, the “political use of 
rhetoric about ‘judicial activism’” is “excessive and unhelpful.”  Even if 
one wants to hold on to the view, as I do, that the term is not entirely 
“empty of content,” and even if one is not ready to conclude that “ju-
dicial activism”—properly understood—is a “myth,” one can and 
should agree that the term today often serves as little more than a slo-
gan or epithet.  I am reminded of then-Justice William Rehnquist’s 
quip in a 1976 Texas Law Review article on the “living constitution” 
claim:  implicitly acknowledging the challenge of contending with a 
constitutional cliché, Rehnquist joked about being in the unenviable, 
“necrophilia[c]” position of playing partisan for the “dead” Constitu-
tion.  In any event, Professor Roosevelt is quite right to insist that the 
important task of “judg[ing] Supreme Court decisions”—the task he 
takes up in his new book—requires and deserves better. 
The same could be said, I think, about the latest Court-related 
mantra, “judicial independence.”  Indeed, when it comes to constitu-
tional sloganeering, “judicial independence” might be the new “judi-
cial activism.”  Justices O’Connor and Breyer—and many others—
have, in recent months, taken to the stump, op-ed pages, and Consti-
tution Day gatherings to warn of dire threats to “judicial independ-
ence.”  But if, as Professor Roosevelt writes, “judicial activism” usually 
† Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. 
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does little more than “register[] disapproval of a decision,” these pro-
fessions of concern for “judicial independence” similarly seem to sig-
nal little more than impatience with those who persist in registering 
such disapproval.  To believe, as we all should, that judges and the ju-
dicial process should be “independent” of partisan and political pres-
sures, and that they should be free and protected from threats and all 
other forms of intimidation, is not (and need not be) to believe that 
judges and judicial rulings are (or should be) immune or insulated 
from forceful criticism in the public and political arenas. 
Turning back to “judicial activism”:  it strikes me that the term has 
become even more devoid of content since the Rehnquist Court’s crit-
ics began following their conservative counterparts in flinging the 
charge.  Over the past decade, and particularly in the last few years, 
many prominent scholars and Court-watchers—Professor Cass Sun-
stein, Professor Jeff Rosen, E.J. Dionne, Adam Cohen, etc.—have 
latched onto the “conservative judicial activism” theme, insisting that 
the Supreme Court’s more conservative Justices are every bit as “activ-
ist” as their progressive counterparts.  According to Professor Sun-
stein, for example, the Court’s activist, conservative “fundamentalists” 
“think that in the last 50 years, constitutional law has gone badly, even 
wildly, wrong,” and they “welcome a highly activist role for the federal 
courts.”  Their evidence?  Since the 1995 Lopez case, conservative Jus-
tices have struck down a number of federal statutes on structural-
federalism and sovereign-immunity grounds. 
It seems to me that Professor Lori Ringhand’s recent widely re-
marked study, “Judicial Activism and the Rehnquist Court,” is in a 
similar vein.  In order to “quantifiably demonstrate that there is little 
correlation between . . . judicial activism, counter-majoritarianism, 
and political liberalism,” Professor Ringhand “examines individual ju-
dicial votes to invalidate federal and state laws, and to overturn exist-
ing precedents.”  And, it turns out that the Court’s conservative Jus-
tices are “no less likely than their more liberal counterparts to 
invalidate legislation and overturn precedent, and to do so in ideo-
logical ways.” 
On the one hand, Professor Ringhand’s approach seems consis-
tent with, and responsive to, the concern that both Professor Roose-
velt and I share, namely, that the term “judicial activism” often indi-
cates merely the speaker’s disapproval.  Her approach, it might seem, 
offers an objective way of establishing that, in fact, the standard ac-
count of “judicial activism”—i.e., liberal Justices impose their policy 
preferences and “legislate from the bench” while conservative Justices 
are humble, “strict constructionists”—is a myth. 
I have at least two reservations, though, and I would welcome Pro-
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fessor Roosevelt’s views on these points.  First, it seems to me both 
possible and important to distinguish between votes to invalidate the 
policy choices of state legislatures as inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion’s substantive individual-rights provisions, and votes to invalidate 
regulatory measures enacted by Congress as outside Congress’s enu-
merated powers.  That is, it is one thing to invalidate federal laws for 
reasons having to do with the distribution of power; it is another, it 
seems to me, to strike down state laws as misuses of power.  Second, it 
is not at all clear to me why a Justice’s votes to invalidate the Court’s 
own precedents should count as evidence of judicial activism.  (I owe 
this point to Professor Larry Solum.)  Why would a Justice’s vote to 
correct her own, or her judicial colleagues’, or her judicial predeces-
sors’ error indicate the kind of over-eager second-guessing of politi-
cally accountable actors that we normally associate with “activism?”  
Turning to Professor Roosevelt’s project, what role should stare decisis 
considerations play in our evaluation of judges’ work and decisions? 
It is (long past) time to turn to Professor Roosevelt’s proposed 
method of deciding whether the Court’s doctrines and decisions are 
sensible.  At the heart of his argument is the idea of “deference”:  
“Deference strikes me as the central concept . . . . [because] a surpris-
ing amount of doctrine boils down to the choice of a particular level 
of deference.”  And so, before turning to the four factors he suggests 
are most important to deciding whether or not a court should “defer” 
to another actor or institution, it is worth asking:  what do we mean by 
“deference?” 
Clearly, appellate courts do and should “defer” to lower courts 
and non-judicial officials all the time.  By “defer,” though, does Pro-
fessor Roosevelt mean “go along with a reading of the Constitution 
that the reviewing judge believes, in light of her preferred method of 
constitutional interpretation, is mistaken?”  Or, “go along with an ap-
plication of a rule that the reviewing judge agrees is, in fact, the rule 
that the Constitution provides, even though she thinks the rule was 
applied incorrectly, or to facts found erroneously?”  Or something 
else?  Does “deference” go to the question of whether the actor whose 
decision, conduct, or policy is being reviewed got things wrong, or to 
the question of whether that actor’s error should be corrected?  Pro-
fessor Roosevelt has suggested that our evaluation of the Court’s doc-
trine should focus on whether the Court is showing appropriate “def-
erence.”  I hope it is not too fastidious to ask for clarification on what 
“deference” is. 
Another question:  Professor Roosevelt notes—and I agree—that 
“most of the difficult and controversial constitutional cases don’t have 
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clear right answers.”  And, he contends—correctly, I believe—that the 
“plain meaning” of the Constitution’s text is not always so plain.  
When developing and applying doctrine, though, what is the role, if 
any, of the “original meaning” of the relevant text?  Let’s take it as 
given that the “original meaning” and original expected applications 
of constitutional text are not always easy, or even possible, to pin 
down.  But are they relevant to our assessment of doctrine and deci-
sions?  How?  Is original meaning a factor, at all, in the “deference” 
inquiry that Professor Roosevelt proposes?  He states that one variant 
of “originalism” “suggests that doctrine is unnecessary,” and I do not 
mean to endorse such a variant.  I assume we do need doctrine.  I 
wonder, though, whether or not Professor Roosevelt believes that the 
construction of doctrine and its deployment need to be shaped and 
meaningfully confined, not only by considerations of “institutional 
competence” and “lessons of history,” but also by the text’s original 
meaning and historically rooted paradigm cases. 
Finally, in his recent Walter F. Murphy Lecture, “Constitutional 
Virtues” (published in the Green Bag), Professor H. Jefferson Powell 
took up the question, why does the Constitution bind?  Does it have, 
and how does it have, “legitimate authority?”  Along the way to answer-
ing that question, he identifies “humility” as a constitutional virtue, 
and defines it as: 
the habit of doubting that the Constitution resolves divisive political or 
social issues as opposed to requiring them to be thrashed out through 
the processes of ordinary, revisable politics. . . .  [t]his virtue manifests it-
self in the continuing recognition that the Constitution is primarily a 
framework for political argument and decision and not a tool for the 
elimination of debate. 
It seems to me that “judicial activism” might be salvaged, and used 
as a way of identifying and criticizing decisions—such as, in my view, 
Casey—that fail to demonstrate this virtue. 
 
Professor Roosevelt’s aim, in The Myth of Judicial Activism—that is, 
to help us move past the ineffective, loaded lobbing of “activism”-as-
epithet to a conceptually clear, attractive, and usable understanding of 
how judges ought to do their jobs—is a worthy and important one.  I 
look forward to hearing more. 
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CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Kermit Roosevelt III 
As always, Professor Garnett’s thoughts prompt me to clarify and 
reconsider my own.  I think he is quite right to point out that “judicial 
independence” shows the potential to become as mindless a slogan as 
“judicial activism.”  (Interestingly, George Lakoff’s recent book, re-
viewed unflatteringly here by Stephen Pinker, urges just this move:  ac-
tivist judges should be “rebranded” as “freedom judges.”)  But I do 
not, at the moment, see shouts of “judicial independence!” stifling 
honest criticism of judges in the way that shouts of “judicial activism!” 
threaten to undermine judicial independence via jurisdiction-
stripping or impeachment.  (Admittedly, I think both of these threats 
are remote, but they are an important strain in the rhetoric of activ-
ism.) 
Perhaps more importantly, I think we can make judicial inde-
pendence a meaningful phrase.  The appeal to judicial independence 
asks us to distinguish between constructive criticism of the judiciary—
arguments that a particular decision makes a mistake in its reasoning, 
or history, or the like—and attempts to intimidate or overawe judges, 
and to disavow the latter.  I put assertions that judges are abusing their 
power or acting in bad faith in the latter category, and I think they are 
undesirable (unless, of course, they are accurate, which I do not think 
they are).  Put another way, judicial independence asks us to give 
judges the freedom to make decisions we think are wrong, as long as 
they are honestly wrong.  It recognizes that the remedy for such deci-
sions is the appointments process. 
Can we give similarly useful content to the notion of activism?  Ac-
tivism is related to independence as I have defined it in that activist 
decisions are those that are dishonestly wrong, the product of bad 
faith.  Activist decisions are the ones that are not protected by the ap-
peal to independence.  The problem is that there is no agreed-upon 
way to determine which decisions fit that bill. 
This might seem to be as much of a problem for “independence” 
as for “activism,” since appropriate appeals to independence likewise 
depend on the distinction between good-faith error and bad-faith ac-
tivism.  In my book, I offer the concept of legitimacy as a different way 
of thinking about bad faith.  I define legitimacy as choosing a level of 
deference for which there is some justification in terms of institutional 
competence, or history, or structural analysis of the democratic proc-
ess.  It turns out that most decisions are legitimate, as I define the 
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term; that is, there is some justification other than political will for 
what the Court has done.  So, my analysis suggests that while we can, 
to some degree, distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate deci-
sions, the best way I can think of to draw that line makes most of them 
appear legitimate (i.e., not rendered in bad faith).  And thus, most of 
them can appropriately be defended by the appeal to independence. 
That is my attempt to make sense of “activism,” and its upshot is 
that activism in the sense of bad-faith decision making is very rare, or 
at least that we can very rarely be confident about identifying it.  
Other people, as Professor Garnett notes, have taken a different ap-
proach.  They define activism in such a way that it is both objectively 
identifiable and fairly common:  activism is voting to strike down a 
state or federal law or to overturn a prior precedent. 
I agree with Professor Garnett that this redefinition of judicial ac-
tivism is too often deployed as a political stratagem.  That is, there 
seems to be an attempt to (1) redefine activism so that the term is no 
longer pejorative (because some laws should be struck down and some 
precedents overturned); (2) point out that “conservatives” may do this 
more frequently than “liberals”; and (3) restore the pejorative conno-
tation while asserting that conservatives are the real activists.  This is 
an intellectually dishonest move, and to the extent that some people 
make it (I’m not saying any particular person is), they should be 
ashamed of themselves. 
Assuming that the redefinition is not used to score rhetorical 
points, it still suffers from the basic problem that it gives up the idea 
that activism is something to be condemned.  Thus, while Professor 
Lori Ringhand’s study does tell us something quite interesting, it 
doesn’t tell us much about activism as the term is ordinarily used.  
Professor Ringhand’s findings provide insight on the assertiveness or 
self-confidence of Justices regarding their constitutional views com-
pared to those of other governmental actors or earlier Courts.  The 
concept of deference is central to my analysis—the extent to which a 
Justice is deferential in different circumstances will tell us a lot about 
that Justice’s approach to constitutional decisions, and it might even 
help us in deciding whether the Justice is displaying an inconsistency 
suggestive of bad faith. 
But the “different circumstances” point is key.  Lumping all the 
votes together gives a very imprecise measure.  So I completely agree 
with Professor Garnett that to get the real benefit of the data we need 
to separate out different kinds of cases—federal laws versus state laws; 
limits on federal power versus individual rights; and additionally, 
analysis with different constitutional provisions.  (To Professor Ring-
hand’s credit, I think she has done much of this, and it is in part the 
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media’s fault that the study is being reported in terms of a monolithic 
activism score.)  This additional analysis would allow us to reverse-
engineer a Justice’s decision-making process in terms of the factors 
that suggest greater or lesser deference.  Thus, it would allow us to say 
something about the relative significance that Justices give to the fac-
tors I identified (institutional competence, lessons of history, defects 
in democracy, etc.) and maybe identify other factors. 
If we are interested not in explanations for deference (or its lack 
thereof) but rather in the conventional understanding of activism, 
there are perhaps other reasons.  Striking down a law as beyond fed-
eral power does not prevent states from regulating, and therefore it 
perhaps looks less like the imposition of a judge’s political prefer-
ences.  (Assuming, that is, that “state regulation rather than federal” is 
not an impermissible political preference for the judiciary.  I would 
call it a “high politics” preference, and permissible in a way that hostil-
ity to a particular law is not.)  On the other hand, hostility to a particu-
lar law might lead a judge to strike it down to the extent that she can, 
even if she can’t prevent all regulation.  So, it may very well be that a 
ruling that a law goes beyond federal power is just as likely to be made 
in bad faith as a ruling that an activity is constitutionally shielded from 
all regulation.  Again, though, I do not think that bad faith is present 
in any but a vanishingly small set of cases. 
Whether votes to overturn precedent should count is also an in-
teresting question.  Such votes tell us something interesting about how 
assertive the Justice is with respect to past Courts, or the degree of in-
tra-branch deference.  Since I have already said that I would like to see 
the activism score broken down, I do not see any harm in also having 
this data available.  Conceivably this data could be used to create a 
baseline measurement for the assertiveness of individual Justices, 
apart from the complicating variables of different constitutional provi-
sions and different actors under review. 
This brings me to the question of what I mean by deference, 
something I should have made clearer in my opening statement.  I 
mean basically the use of what Larry Sager has called an “under-
enforcing rule.”  Take the Equal Protection Clause as an example, and 
suppose for the moment that we agree that the meaning of this provi-
sion is something like “states may not engage in discrimination with-
out adequate justification.”  (You may not agree, in which case we 
would have to have a longer conversation, but to explain my perspec-
tive, suppose that for now.)  Obviously, the doctrine or tests that the 
Court applies in actual cases—the tiers of scrutiny—differ from this 
meaning.  Rational basis review under-enforces—it lets discrimination 
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stand, not if the Court thinks it is justified, but if the legislature might 
rationally have thought it promoted some legitimate interest.  I would 
call strict scrutiny an anti-deferential doctrinal rule—it does not defer 
but actually stacks the deck against the legislature; it will strike down 
some discrimination that’s consistent with the meaning of the Consti-
tution.  So the question for the Court is when to adopt a deferential 
stance and under-enforce—i.e., leave responsibility for compliance 
largely with the body whose action it is reviewing—and when to adopt 
an anti-deferential stance. 
Meaning is relevant from my perspective because in assessing the 
Court’s performance, I think we need to start with meaning, and then 
ask which institution is best at determining whether some governmen-
tal act complies with that meaning.  That tells us whether a deferen-
tial, non-deferential, or anti-deferential doctrine is appropriate.  Hu-
mility, as Jefferson Powell defines it, fits neatly with this model:  a 
humble Court will tend to be deferential; it will give the representative 
branches of government wide latitude to hash out policy matters.  De-
fining activism as a lack of humility is tempting, but I think that it suf-
fers the same problem as Professor Ringhand’s definition (to which it 
is essentially equivalent):  sometimes the Constitution does resolve di-
visive social issues.  It does so clearly on occasion (as with the eradica-
tion of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment) and less clearly on oth-
ers (as with the prohibition on racially segregated schooling that 
Brown found in the Fourteenth Amendment).  Whether it resolves 
disputes about abortion or gay rights is a hard question. 
I agree with Professor Garnett’s assessment of Casey in so far as I 
am not a fan of fundamental rights substantive due process—I do not 
believe it makes sense for judges to be charged with identifying and 
protecting these mysterious fundamental rights, and I do not think 
the text or history of the Due Process Clause provide a basis for the 
practice.  (Whether the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause might is a different question.)  But, I think that what 
the Court has done in those areas is defensible from the perspective of 
asking what the appropriate level of deference is; that is, I think that 
abortion restrictions present situations in which legislatures cannot 
necessarily be trusted to balance costs and benefits accurately.  And 
since I think that the Due Process Clause can fairly be read to com-
mand legislatures to weigh the interests of all affected people equally 
(though this is a meaning that usually will be under-enforced) I think 
that the decisions are at least legitimate, even if different approaches 
might be preferable.  If we want different approaches (and we may), 
then we should appoint Justices who will follow them (and we may 
have).  As I like to tell my students, in the end we get the Constitution 
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we deserve. 
 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
Richard W. Garnett 
I appreciate Professor Roosevelt’s response to my thoughts and 
questions.  These two back-and-forth exchanges have been enjoyable 
and helpful for me, though I am all too aware that we have only 
scratched the surface of the important issues raised and explored in 
The Myth of Judicial Activism. 
After reflecting on Professor Roosevelt’s latest contribution, I 
think it is clear that we agree that “judicial independence” is impor-
tant, and that the term can and should be used meaningfully.  We also 
agree that efforts to “intimidate or overawe” judges would threaten 
“judicial independence,” properly understood.  That is, Justice 
O’Connor was right, in her recent Wall Street Journal essay, to remind 
us that “we must be . . . vigilant in making sure that criticism does not 
cross over into intimidation.”  On the other hand, I think Professor 
Roosevelt and I agree that forceful, “honest criticism” of judges and 
their rulings should not be regarded as disrespecting or undermining 
judicial independence and also that it would be unfortunate if argu-
ments about the importance of “judicial independence” were de-
ployed merely to silence critics or to insulate judges’ rulings from cri-
tique. 
We might part ways when it comes to identifying the more serious 
threat—the misuse of “judicial activism” or the misuse of “judicial in-
dependence”—to the rule of law.  (Of course, it is worth remember-
ing, and being thankful, that—as Professor Roosevelt points out—
“both of these threats are remote.”)  At present, I am more concerned 
about the latter.  On balance, I am inclined to agree with Judge Wil-
liam Pryor, who insisted in his own Wall Street Journal piece that “criti-
cism of judicial decisions is essential to the progress of our constitu-
tional republic” and that the best way for judges to protect their 
independence is not to scold those who protest their rulings but in-
stead to take particular care to exercise—as The Federalist put it—
“neither force nor will, but merely judgment.”  All things considered, I 
am troubled more by, say, the language (usually attributed to Justice 
Souter) in the Casey joint opinion impatiently “call[ing] the 
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national 
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division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution” 
than I am by, say, grandstanding politicians’ half-hearted efforts to 
prevent the Court from considering challenges to the language of the 
Pledge of Allegiance. 
Professor Roosevelt suggests, in his closing statement, that we can 
usefully identify “activist” decisions as “those that are dishonestly 
wrong, the product of bad faith.”  I wonder, is this definition too nar-
row?  Does it capture what it is that those who attempt to use terms 
like “activist” and “judicial activism” in a serious and careful way are 
getting at?  I’m not sure.  It is one thing, it seems to me, to charge that 
a judge who renders a decision whose outcome one dislikes on policy 
or moral grounds has “dishonestly” arrived at that outcome; it is an-
other, it seems to me, to say that a judge “[]honestly” has chosen to 
employ an inappropriately “activist” interpretive approach or doc-
trine. 
We can concede, for example, that Justice O’Connor is being 
scrupulously honest when she announces her conclusion that a par-
ticular religious display unconstitutionally “endorses” religion.  That 
is, there is no need to doubt that she is honestly reporting her belief 
that the display in question is likely to be perceived by a reasonable 
observer as having the purpose or effect of making non-adherents feel 
like “outsiders, not full members of the political community.”  I do 
not believe, though, that this concession disables us from criticizing 
her religious display decision, or her approach to the Establishment 
Clause, on the ground that it owes more to her intuitions and ideals, 
or to her beliefs about the role and capacities of judges, than to the 
constraints that the Constitution in fact imposes on state actors. 
I could offer, and—I am sure—Professor Roosevelt and I could 
debate, many other similar examples.  For now, I will simply suggest 
that a ruling or approach can be both “honest” and “activist.”  To be 
clear:  Professor Roosevelt and I agree that “judicial activism” is mis-
used in the public debate, and is in need of clarifying analysis.  Like 
the words “controversial,” “partisan,” and “divisive,” the term “activ-
ism” is too often an epithet lacking content.  (As Justice Thomas put it 
during his confirmation hearings, “judicial activism is when the court 
rules against you.”)  It seems to me, though, that to focus too closely 
on a judge’s honesty—or, for that matter, as Professor Ringhand does, 
on whether a judge’s decision invalidates a legislative act or reverses a 
precedent—might be to lose some of the term’s serviceable, and im-
portant meaning. 
In a comment published in 2004 in the California Law Review, 
Keenan Kmiec identified a magazine article written in 1947 by Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., as the Ur-text for “judicial activism.”  In that piece, 
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Schlesinger proposed that the Court was split into at least two distinct 
camps, the “judicial activists” and the “champions of self restraint.”  
The former, he contended, were marked by the view that the Court 
“can play an affirmative role in promoting the social welfare.”  The 
former were  
more concerned with the employment of judicial power for their own 
conception of the social good; [the latter] with expanding the range of 
allowable judgment for legislatures, even if it means upholding conclu-
sions they privately condemn.  One group regards the Court as an in-
strument to achieve desired social results; the second as an instrument to 
permit the other branches of government to achieve the results the peo-
ple want for better or worse. 
I do not think Schlesinger’s claim was that the “activists” were dis-
honest—i.e., that they invalidated policies that they believed were con-
stitutional but to which they objected on political or moral grounds.  
Instead, the heart of “judicial activis[m]” seemed to be, for 
Schlesinger, an excessive confidence in judges’ ability and authoriza-
tion to push policy in the right direction.  To be “activist,” perhaps, is 
not to willfully substitute one’s notion of the social good for the Con-
stitution; it is to adopt and apply an interpretive approach or stance 
that, when honestly and scrupulously applied, nevertheless imports 
the Constitution’s enforceable content from one’s (or one’s like-
minded “reasonable” friends’) political and moral beliefs. 
All this brings me back to Professor Roosevelt’s opening contribu-
tion, and to the thesis of his new book.  Again, he proposes that the 
“best way” to “decide whether the doctrine that the Court has crafted 
is sensible” is to “think in terms of deference.”  And he identifies, in 
his opening statement, the “four most important” factors that “suggest 
that courts should defer or should not”:  “institutional competence,” 
“defects in democracy,” “lessons of history,” and “costs of error.” 
With respect to the “institutional competence” factor, I agree that 
“many important constitutional provisions . . . have a cost-benefit bal-
ancing component”—the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness re-
quirement, for example—and that the task of interpreting and enforc-
ing the Constitution will often require judges to decide which 
institution or branch of government is “better at assessing costs and 
benefits in a particular context.”  However, I am not sure that the fact 
that a particular institution or branch is “better at assessing costs and 
benefits in a particular context” means that that branch is constitu-
tionally authorized to strike and enforce the cost-benefit balance, or 
to second-guess the assessment of even a less-able institution or 
branch.  Professor Roosevelt and I agree that, generally speaking, the 
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job of “weighing competing policies” is best “left to the representative 
branches for reasons of democratic accountability.”  I would also want 
to consider, though, the possibility that—putting aside concerns about 
competence and “accountability”—the Court might not always be 
constitutionally authorized to take up the balancing task.  The ques-
tion of a state actor’s power to act is, I think, prior to the question of 
its ability to act wisely, in accord with the correct cost-benefit balance. 
Professor Roosevelt’s second factor, “defects in democracy,” “at-
tempts to identify cases in which the legislative assessment will be sus-
pect for structural reasons.”  I am uneasy, though—Professor Ely not-
withstanding—with the view that the Court is charged with evaluating 
and supervising the democratic process.  Turning to the “lessons of 
history” factor, I have similar reservations about inviting judges to 
“consider[] whether particular actors have proven themselves trust-
worthy or untrustworthy in particular circumstances.”  It is not that 
such untrustworthiness is never relevant, but it does not seem to me 
that the power of a politically accountable actor or institution to act 
waxes and wanes with the Court’s assessment of its past performance. 
Finally, Professor Roosevelt writes that the “[c]osts of error” factor 
“attempts to decide whether it is worse in a certain set of cases for the 
courts to err by upholding an unconstitutional act or striking down a 
constitutional one.”  I agree that this factor is crucial to the evaluation 
of doctrine and decisions.  And, it suggests an important distinction 
between the “federalism” decisions—in which the Court has invali-
dated acts of Congress and which have been criticized by Professor 
Sunstein and others as “activist”—and those decisions, like Roe v. 
Wade, to which many conservatives have attached that label.  Could it 
be that constitutionalized errors regarding the constraints that indi-
vidual-rights provisions impose on governments’ regulatory power are 
“costly” in ways that even wrongheaded decisions about the vertical 
and horizontal allocation of powers are not? 
After all, a decision like Lopez says nothing about the merits of 
gun-control proposals, or even about their permissibility as a general 
matter.  Such a decision merely affirms that the power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce does not extend so far as to allow it to 
prohibit the possession of guns near local schools.  It does not purport 
to end the gun-control discussion or resolve the gun-control debate; it 
leaves those who want to keep guns away from schools free to make 
their case to the politically accountable body that is constitutionally 
authorized to enact the measures they support.  There are, I believe, 
significant, if not always recognized, costs that attend decisions that do 
not simply declare—as the Court did in Lopez—that one side in a pol-
icy debate pursued its aims in the wrong legislature, but rather an-
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nounce that one side acted with “animus,” or embraced a “cruel” pun-
ishment, or attacked fellow citizens’ fundamental liberties.  It is less 
“costly”—and, perhaps, less “activist”—to tell the losers in a case to 
fight in another arena than to tell them, in effect, that there is some-
thing unworthy, and un-American, about pressing the fight at all. 
 
In his opening statement, after making the case for a focus on def-
erence, Professor Roosevelt wrote, “[a]ll of this sounds reasonable, I 
hope.”  Indeed, it does.  His project, and the generous, thoughtful, 
charitable spirit that animates it, are commendable.  I am grateful for 
the opportunity to share my own questions, comments, reservations, 
and respect. 
 
